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The Case to Preserve Criminal Jurisdiction
Immunity Accorded Foreign Diplomatic
and Consular Personnel in the
United States
by
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In September of 1988, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
voted to send Senate Bill No. S. 1437 to the floor for consideration by the
full Senate. This proposed legislation provides in relevant part:1
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1. Senate Bill No. S.1437 was introduced by Senator Helms on June 26, 1987, 100th
Cong., Ist Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S8876-77 (daily ed. June 26, 1987). The Senate did not act
on S.1437 before the 100th Congress ended. The Senate also did not act on an amendment to
the Foreign Missions Act proposed by Senator Helms during the second session of the 100th
Congress. See 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REc. S16,045-47 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988); see
also, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. S13,811-13 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1988). The
amendment sought to compel the State Department to declare an individual entitled to diplo-
matic immunity, who is believed to have committed a serious crime, persona non grata when-
ever the Foreign Ministry refuses to waive that individual's immunity from criminal
jurisdiction. The proposed amendment effectively would shift the burden of proof presently
imposed by law upon the receiving state to the sending state with respect to diplomatic immu-
[3511
[t]hat ... notwithstanding.., the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations ... and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations...
members of a foreign diplomatic mission (other than diplomatic
agents) and members of a foreign consular post (other than consular
officers) shall not be entitled to immunity from the criminal jurisdic-
tion of the United States (or any State) for any crime of violence....
for drug trafficking, or for reckless driving or driving while intoxicated
or under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
2
Viewed narrowly, legislation such as S. 1437 would remove immu-
nity from criminal jurisdiction for all foreign diplomatic and consular
personnel not classified as diplomatic agents or as consular officers and
their respective family members, making them liable to arrest, detention,
and prosecution.3 Viewed broadly, the enactment of S. 1437 or similar
nity. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 84-85. It remains to be seen whether a bill
similar to S.1437 will be introduced during the 101st Congress in 1989.
In 1987, S.339 also was introduced in the Senate to remove diplomatic immunity when a
"member of a foreign diplomatic mission... use[s] a firearm to commit.., a felony under the
criminal laws of the United States or any State." S.339, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG.
REC. 5959-60 (daily ed. Jan 20, 1987).
2. S.1437 provides in full:
To make certain members of foreign diplomatic missions and consular posts in the
United States subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the United States with respect to
crimes of violence.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled,
That (a) notwithstanding any other provision of law and, particularly, the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, done on April 18, 1961, and the Vienna Con-
vention on Consular Relations, done on April 24, 1963, members of a foreign diplo-
matic mission (other than diplomatic agents) and members of a foreign consular post
(other than consular officers) shall not be entitled to immunity from the criminal
jurisdiction of the United States (or of any State) for any crime of violence, as de-
fined in section 16 of title 18, United States Code, or for reckless driving or driving
while intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
(b) For purposes of this Act
(1) the term "consular officer" has the same meaning as is given to such term in
Article l(1)(d) of the Vienna Convention Consular Relations;
(2) the term "diplomatic agent" has the same meaning as is given to such term
in Article 1(e) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations;
(3) the term "members of a foreign consular post" is used within the meaning of
Article l(l)(g) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations; and
(4) the term "members of a foreign diplomatic mission" is used within the
meaning of Article l(b) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
S.1437, 100th Cong., 1st Sess, 133 CONG. REC. 510, 790 (daily ed. Jul. 28, 1987).
3. See discussion infra notes 45-68. The overall intent of S.1437 seems to be to expose
the family members of a diplomatic agent or consular officer to criminal jurisdiction. The
legislation, however, is drafted in a way that apparently does not remove immunity for family
members of diplomatic agents because family members are not included in the terms "mem-
bers of a mission" or "members of a consular post." The legislation removes immunity only
from "members of a foreign diplomatic mission (other than diplomatic agents) and members of
a foreign consular post (other than consular officers)" and thus preserves criminal jurisdiction
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IMMUNITY
legislation unnecessarily would lend support to growing criticism that in
recent times the United States has disregarded its international law obli-
gations. 4 That disregard, whether actual or perceived, in turn invites
both reciprocal disregard for international law and retaliatory action by
other nations against United States diplomatic and consular personnel
serving abroad.
The proposed legislation reflects an increasing, if misplaced, concern
expressed by a small but vocal segment of American society about the
growing number of crimes allegedly committed in the United States by
foreign diplomatic and consular personnel and their dependents. Senator
Helms (Republican, N.C.) stated his motivation for introducing S. 1437
in simplistic terms by bluntly referring to the "37,000 individuals [living]
in this country who are free to commit any crime, no matter how serious,
how violent, how heinous, and remain free from prosecution." 5 Lay au-
thors erroneously have claimed, in tabloid fashion, that the United States
is in the throes of "a minor diplomatic crime wave" that is "getting out
of control."' 6 Newspaper accounts and editorials have reported crimes by
diplomats ranging from assault, child abuse, weapons and drug dealing
immunity for families of diplomatic and consular post members. It is assumed the legislation
eventually would be redrafted to clarify that all family members would not have immunity
from criminal jurisdiction and our analysis proceeds on that assumption. Otherwise the legis-
lation potentially would be meaningless.
4. For example, the United States' refusal to admit Yassir Arafat to address the United
Nations may have violated the U.N. Headquarters Agreement, 61 Stat. 3416, T.I.A.S. No.
1676, 11 U.N.T.S. 11 (1947); Lewis, U.N. Votes to Move Session to Geneva, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3,
1988, at 1, col. 1 (It was reported that the General Assembly resolved for the first time to leave
New York and move its session to Geneva in reaction to the United States' action, as host
country, in refusing to grant a visa to Yassir Arafat.). See Military and Paramilitary Activities
In And Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27, 1986); U.S. Terminates
Acceptance of ICJ Compulsory Jurisdiction, Oct. 7, 1985, 85 DEP'T ST. BULL. 67 (Jan. 1986),
24 I.L.M. 1742 (1985); US. Withdrawal from the Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua in the
IC, Jan. 18, 1985, 86 DEP'T ST. BULL. 64 (Mar. 1985), 24 I.L.M. 246 (1985); Mining of
Nicaraguan Harbors, Security Council Draft Resolution Condemning the Mining of Nicaraguan
Ports, 39 U.N. SCOR (Apr.-June 1984) at 5, U.N. Doc. S/16463 (1984).
5. 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S8876-77 (daily ed. June 26, 1987). The true
figure is substantially less than 37,000. The State Department reports, in fact, that as of 1987,
26,283 individuals and their dependents enjoy full criminal immunity. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE BRIEFING BOOK TO CONGRESS (1988) (relevant portions on file with The Hastings Law
Journal).
6. See the discussion of the facts of "diplomatic crime" infra text accompanying notes
104-115. See also Gookin, Attacks on Immunity, FOREIGN SERVICE J. 18 (1988) (arguing that
facts of diplomatic crime do not support a broad attack on diplomatic immunity). Trescott
and Ashman have written a book that is a somewhat sensationalized and anecdotal indictment
of the criminal behavior of the foreign diplomatic corps. The book's allegations and assertions
have been challenged by the Department of State's Associate Chief of Protocol. P. TRESCOTT
& C. ASHMAN, DIPLOMATIC CRIME (1987). See Gookin, supra, at 18-20; Gookin, (Letter to
the Editor), Fairfax J., Dec. 3, 1987.
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to rapes, shootings, manslaughter, and spying. 7 Editorials have de-
scribed provocatively the prohibition against criminal prosecution of dip-
lomatic personnel as making "the blood boil," as "immunized outrages,"
and as "hard to swallow."' 8 In a 1986 speech to the American Bar Asso-
ciation, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger said that "the idea of
immunity needs to be re-examined in light of diplomats who abuse their
privileges, particularly through terrorism."9
Legal scholars and commentators, with surprising uniformity, also
have called for the arrest and prosecution of presently immunized diplo-
matic personnel. Former Supreme Court Justice and Ambassador to the
United Nations Arthur Goldberg, responding to the 1984 shoot-out at
the Libyan Embassy in London during which a police constable was
killed by Libyan diplomatic personnel, suggested that the British Gov-
ernment should have "arrested the murderers."' 0 Other commentators
have called for the removal of diplomatic immunity and prosecution "for
criminal conduct which poses substantial probability of physical violence
against individuals.""II Still others urge "[p]rosecuting a [foreign] diplo-
mat for committing serious criminal offenses."'
2
7. See, e.g., Israel Military Aides Granted Immunity, Newsday, Oct. 7, 1988, at 6, col. 1;
Ex-Envoy Indicted on Drugs, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1988, at A8, col. 4; Innocent Plea by Envoy,
Newsday, Apr. 19, 1988, at 15, col. 1; Report on Boy Returned to Africa, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3,
1988, A2, at 39, col. 2.; Taylor, U.S. May Return Boy, 9, To Africa, Court Rules, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 16, 1988, at 3 1, col. 1; Shipp, How a Child Abuse Case Took On International Dimension,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1988, at E36, col. 1; French, State Dep't Awarded Custody of African Boy
in Abuse Case, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1988, at A22, col. 1; Ferrigno, How Foreign Diplomats Get
Away with Crime, Newsday, Oct. 2, 1987, at 81, col. 1; Washington Rejects Effort to Curtail
Diplomatic Immunity, The Times, Aug. 6, 1987, at 7, col. 5; Caplan, Crash of Envoy's Car
Focuses Attention On International Law, Legal Times, May 4, 1987, at 20, col. 1; Lewis, Rea-
gan says Boy Can Be Sent Home, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1987, at B6, col. 1; Engelberg, Russian's
Arrest Called Example Of Spy Threat, N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1986, at A1, col. 1; Reid, A Soviet
Official Assigned To U.N. Is Seized As A Spy, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1986, at 1, col.4; Sciolino,
When Citizens of the World Break the Laws of New York, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1986, at E24,
col. 1; Griffin, Diplomatic Impunity, 13 STUDENT LAW., 18 (Oct. 1984).
8. Anderson, When Immunity May Not a Full Diplomat Make, Newsday, June 6, 1988,
at 58, col. 1; Undiplomatic Immunity, Wash. Post, Aug. 10, 1987, at A14, col. 1.
9. Sciolino, supra note 7, at E24 (quoting speech by Caspar Weinberger).
10. Goldberg, The Shoot-Out at The Libyan Self-styled People's Bureau: A Case of State-
Supported International Terrorism, 30 S.D.L. REV. 1, 4 (1984). The British Government,
rather than arresting the killers, allowed them to leave England because they had immunity
from local criminal jurisdiction. Id.
11. Note, Diplomatic Immunity: A Proposal for Amending the Vienna Convention to De-
ter Violent CriminalActs, 5 B.U. INT'L L.J. 177, 184 (1987) (authored by Stephen L. Wright).
12. Note, Diplomatic Immunity From Criminal Jurisdiction: Essential To Effective Inter-




The purpose of this Article is twofold: first, to place the perception
of "diplomatic crime" in the United States in a proper factual and legal
perspective, and second, to oppose any unilateral legislative attempts, in
contravention of both international and domestic law, to remove immu-
nity from criminal jurisdiction presently accorded to foreign diplomatic
and consular personnel and their dependents residing in the United
States.13 Specifically, the Article suggests that enactment of legislation
such as S.1437, would contravene existing United States and interna-
tional law; that U.S. diplomatic and consular personnel serving at posts
abroad would be exposed unnecessarily to the reciprocal risks of retalia-
tory measures taken by foreign states; that there is no factual justification
for such legislation; that present legal remedies, if vigorously pursued
when necessary, are more than adequate to deter "diplomatic crime";
and that preservation of existing criminal jurisdiction immunity ac-
corded to foreign diplomatic and consular personnel serves both the
short term and long term foreign policy interests of the United States.
Under present law, the United States has the burden to prove that immu-
nity from criminal jurisdiction, once asserted, does not exist.' 4 This Arti-
cle also rejects any attempt to undercut the existing right to criminal
jurisdiction immunity by legislatively shifting the present burden of proof
from the United States government to an accused diplomat's sending
13. This Article is not intended to provide a comprehensive reprise of the current law on
diplomatic and consular relations as this has been amply and admirably accomplished else-
where. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 464-70 (1987); D. BoWETr, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 348-62
(4th ed. 1984); I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 345-63 (3d ed.
1984); E. DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW: COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS (1976); L. LEE, VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS
(1966); C. LEWIS, STATE AND DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY (2d ed. 1985); E. SATOW, SATOW'S
GUIDE To DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE (L. Gore-Booth ed. 5th ed. 1979); B. SEN, A DIPLOMAT'S
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE (3d rev. ed. 1988); M. WHITEMAN, 7
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 253-447, 716-870 (1970); Barnes, Diplomatic Immunity
From Local Jurisdiction: Its Historical Development Under International Law and Application
in United States Practice, 43 DEP'T ST. BULL. 173 (1960); Brown, Diplomatic Immunity: State
Practice Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 37 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 53
(1988); Davidson, Freestone, Lowe & Warbrick, Treaties, Extradition and Diplomatic Immu-
nity: Some Recent Developments, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 425 (1986); Fox, Enforcement Juris-
diction, Foreign Property and Diplomatic Immunity, 34 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 115 (1985);
Garretson, The Immunities of Representatives of Foreign States, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 67 (1966);
Valdez, Privileges and Immunities Under The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and
the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, 15 INT'L LAW. 411 (1981); Note, The Scope of Consular
Immunity Under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: Toward A More Principled
Interpretation, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 841 (1988) (authored by Curtis J. Milhaupt); Comment, A
New Regime of Diplomatic Immunity: The Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, 54 TUL. L. REV.
661 (1979).
14. See infra notes 84-85.
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state to show that immunity exists. 15 This Article also rejects sugges-
tions that the United States should establish either a victims' compensa-
tion fund or an insurance scheme to compensate victims of "diplomatic
crime."'
6
I. Unilateral Removal of Criminal Jurisdiction Immunity
Under International Law, Theory, Custom, and
Treaties
In general, diplomatic and consular personnel provide primary com-
munications and the essential negotiating links between sending and re-
ceiving states. 17  To facilitate those communications and links,
diplomatic and consular personnel are accorded privileges and immuni-
ties in the receiving state that are not enjoyed by other aliens. Immunity
from local criminal jurisdiction is primary among these privileges and
immunities conferred as a matter of right on certain foreign diplomatic
and consular personnel by customary international law, by multilateral
convention, or by special bilateral treaty. In addition, the United States
is in the special position of host nation to certain international organiza-
tions, such as the United Nations and the Organization of American
States (OAS).' 8 As host nation, the United States accords certain repre-
sentatives to those organizations, and representatives to their member
states, privileges and immunities similar to those enjoyed by members of
foreign diplomatic missions or consular posts, including criminal juris-
diction immunity. 19
The removal of criminal jurisdiction immunity by legislation like
S. 1437 is aimed at two classes of personnel: (1) members of a foreign
15. See 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. S16,045-47 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (Sen-
ator Helms' remarks and introduction into the record of the "Diplomatic Immunity Abuse
Prevention Act"). Helms introduced legislation that would shift the burden of proof from the
United States to show that immunity does not exist, requiring instead that sending states
demonstrate that immunity does exist.
16. In his proposed amendment to the Foreign Missions Act, Senator Helms cited as an
important element of the amendment the establishment of "liability insurance requirements
which can reasonable [sic] be expected to afford adequate compensation for injury to person or
property resulting from or arising out of the activities of the mission." Id. at S16,046. These
requirements are intended to "set in motion" safeguards to ensure that future victims of diplo-
matic crime will be compensated at some minimum level.
17. The host state of foreign diplomatic and consular personnel is the receiving state and
the state represented by those personnel is the sending state.
18. See infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
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diplomatic mission other than diplomatic agents, and (2) members of a
foreign consular post other than consular officers.20
A. Removal of Criminal Jurisdiction Immunity for Members of a
Diplomatic Mission Other Than Diplomatic Agents Violates
Theories Underlying Diplomatic Immunity
Proponents of the unilateral removal of immunity from criminal ju-
risdiction2' for foreign diplomatic personnel, conferred as a matter of
right by international law, argue that there is no theoretical justification
for that immunity. The argument rests on the erroneous assumption that
the sole justification for diplomatic immunity is to assure that foreign
diplomatic personnel function effectively in the receiving state.22 Having
thus limited the theory of diplomatic immunity, it is relatively easy to
argue that criminal behavior is outside the proper function of diplomatic
personnel and thus, that there is no theoretical justification for immunity
from criminal jurisdiction. That argument errs for two reasons. First,
immunity from receiving state criminal jurisdiction rests not on func-
tional necessity alone, but on a number of theories, each of which is con-
travened by unilateral removal of criminal jurisdiction immunity.
20. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
21. For purposes of this Article reference to immunity from criminal jurisdiction includes
inviolability from arrest and detention even though inviolability and immunity are the objects
of separate articles in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, done April 10, 1961, 23
U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 5702, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter Diplomatic Convention]. Article
29 of the Diplomatic Convention provides in relevant part: "The person of a diplomatic agent
shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention." 23 U.S.T. at
3240, T.I.A.S. No. 5702, at 14, 500 U.N.T.S. at 110. Article 31 (1) provides in the first sen-
tence: "A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiv-
ing State." 23 U.S.T. at 3240, T.I.A.S. No. 5702, at 14, 500 U.N.T.S. at 112. There seems to
be some confusion about whether these provisions overlap or are distinct. Professor Brownlie
views "inviolability [as] distinct from the immunity from criminal jurisdiction." I. BROWN-
LIE, supra note 13, at 353. However, Professor Denza observes that "[i]mmunity from crimi-
nal jurisdiction was originally regarded as an aspect of inviolability" E. DENZA, supra note 13,
at 149, and Professor Brown states that the "nature of diplomatic immunity, and in particular
its scope, cannot be considered independently of the fundamental rule of inviolability."
Brown, supra note 13, at 72. That confusion does not disturb the net effect of articles 29 and
31 that a receiving state may not arrest or detain diplomatic personnel and that diplomatic
personnel are immune as a matter of right from a receiving state's criminal jurisdiction. Taken
together, these provisions make clear that present international law confers absolute immunity
on qualifying diplomatic personnel from local criminal jurisdiction and categorically forbids,
in most cases, their arrest or detention by the receiving state.
22. For example, recent writers advocating removal of immunity from criminal jurisdic-
tion for diplomatic personnel refer to "the theory of 'functional necessity' as the only accepta-
ble theory" for diplomatic immunity, Note, supra note 13, at 201 n.136, and to functional
necessity as "the most widely accepted current justification of diplomatic immunity." Ross,
Rethinking Diplomatic Immunity: A Review of Remedial Approaches to Address the Abuses of
Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities, 4 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 173, 178 (1989).
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Second, unilateral removal of immunity from criminal jurisdiction does,
in any event, inhibit the effective functioning of diplomatic personnel.
Immunity from criminal jurisdiction does not rest solely on func-
tional necessity. Rather, it depends on several complementary theoreti-
cal premises, including the representation of states, the sovereign equality
of states, and the important associated principle of reciprocity, as well as
functional necessity. The underlying rationales for the existing law on
diplomatic privileges and immunities were characterized accurately by
Professor Brownlie as depending on no single theory and especially not
on functional necessity alone.
The existing legal position in truth rests on no particular theory or
combination of theories, though in a very general way it is compatible
with both the representative theory, which emphasizes the diplomat's
role as agent of a sovereign state, and the functional theory, which
rests on practical necessity. The latter theory is fashionable but some-
what question-begging. 23
Anyone attempting to unilaterally change the nature and scope of
immunity from criminal jurisdiction presently afforded by the law of dip-
lomatic relations should consider the effect that change would have on
each of the interrelated premises upon which immunity is founded.
Diplomatic immunity inherently facilitates the representation of the
sovereign sending state's interests in the receiving state. The primary
duty of a diplomatic agent is to represent the sending sovereign state and
the sending state cannot function except as through its representatives.
Indeed, the preamble to the Diplomatic Convention explicitly recognizes
that "the purpose of [diplomatic] privileges and immunities is not to ben-
efit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of the functions of
diplomatic missions as representing States.
' '24
In addition, immunity from local criminal jurisdiction reflects both
the preservation of the sovereign equality of the sending and receiving
states and the important related notion of reciprocity. Again the pream-
ble to the Diplomatic Convention explicitly acknowledges that it has "in
mind" a "concern [for] the sovereign equality of States."' 25 Indeed, the
unilateral assertion of criminal law prescriptive and enforcement jurisdic-
23. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 345. It should be noted there is agreement that the
theory of extraterritoriality under which diplomatic premises are said to constitute an exten-
sion of the sending state's territory is no longer an accepted justification for affording diplo-
matic immunity. See Radwan v. Radwan, 3 W.L.R. 735, 55 I.L.R. 579 (1972); SWEENEY,
OLIVER & LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 933 (3d ed. 1988).
24. Diplomatic Convention, supra note 21, 23 U.S.T. at 3230, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, at 4,




tion (as opposed to civil jurisdiction)26 by a receiving state over the send-
ing state's diplomatic representative in every case involves a clash of
sovereign state interests and upsets the theoretical sovereign equality be-
tween the sending and receiving states because one state's institutional
machinery (the criminal process) is exercised ab initio over another
state's representative without that state's permission. Sovereign equality
would be especially upset if the exercise of criminal jurisdiction were a
manifestation of receiving state policy.
27
Related to the preservation of sovereign equality is the notion of
reciprocity.28 The United States, as a receiving state, understandably is
concerned with the behavior of diplomats on United States soil. As a
sending state, it reciprocally desires maximum protection for its diplo-
mats serving around the world.29 In addition, the precise scope of diplo-
matic duties, absent special bilateral agreements, usually is determined
on an ad hoe basis by mutual negotiations between the sending and re-
26. Of course, the question of a clash of state interests over diplomatic and consular
relations is not as great in civil matters in which, for the most part, private rather than state
interests are involved. Sending state civil jurisdiction over diplomatic personnel rarely entails
concerns over the sovereign equality of states or the representation of state interests. In that
context, functional necessity is arguably the primary concern that must be addressed. See
Bergman v. DeSieyes, 170 F.2d 360, 362-63 (2d Cir. 1948) (indignity to the sovereign is of
much less consequence in a civil action than in a criminal prosecution). Article 31(2) of the
Diplomatic Convention in providing for exceptions to civil jurisdiction immunity explicitly
recognizes the lesser threat to sovereign equality posed by civil actions and appropriately al-
ludes to functional necessity as grounds for restricting immunity from civil and administration
receiving state jurisdiction Diplomatic Convention, supra note 21, 3227 U.T.S. at 3244,
T.I.A.S. No. 5702, at 14-15, 500 U.N.T.S. at 116.
27. It is interesting to observe that while the Diplomatic Convention restricts somewhat
the civil jurisdiction immunity in article 31, it does not disturb the absolute criminal jurisdic-
tion immunity contained in articles 29 and 31(1). The distinction between criminal and civil
jurisdiction may not matter as much conceptually when viewed from a general jurisdiction
perspective because ultimately civil jurisdiction might require enforcement procedures that
include criminal sanctions. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 299; D. BOWETT, supra note
13, at 555-56; Bowett, Jurisdiction.: Changing Patterns of Authority Over Activities and Re-
sources in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 556 (1983) ("What mat-
ters is ... whether the jurisdiction is a matter of state policy.").
28. Both the Diplomatic Convention in article 47 and the Vienna Convention of Consular
Relations in article 72 provide that a receiving state may restrictively apply any of the Conven-
tion's provisions when its mission reciprocally has been subject to a restrictive application by
the sending state. These provisions codify the notion that receiving states need only accommo-
date a foreign mission to the extent that its mission receives comparable treatment in the host
state, thereby implicitly recognizing a basis for retaliation in appropriate circumstances. Dip-
lornatic Convention, supra note 21, 23 U.S.T. 3249-50, T.I.A.S. No. 5702, at 22-23, 500
U.N.T.S. at 122-24; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, done April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T.
77, 120-21, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, at 44-45, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter Convention on Consu-
lar Relations].
29. The United States currently has more than 30,000 diplomats serving in foreign coun-
tries around the world. See Gookin, supra note 6, at 20.
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ceiving states. 30 Indeed, the refusal of the British government to arrest
the Libyan diplomats who killed Constable Fletcher surely must have
been to deny Libya an opportunity to reciprocate by arresting British
diplomats on trumped up criminal charges. 3' If the United States unilat-
erally were to subject a diplomat of a foreign state to local criminal juris-
diction, on a reciprocity basis the sending state would be entitled or even
compelled, if sovereign equality is to be maintained, to subject United
States diplomats to its local criminal jurisdiction.
32
The exposure of United States diplomatic and consular personnel to
foreign state criminal jurisdiction, as a reciprocal response to enactment
of legislation such as S. 1437, would have several adverse practical conse-
quences. First, any action and reaction cycle of reciprocal criminal pros-
ecutions of diplomatic and consular personnel by sending and receiving
states that might ensue squarely contradicts the promotion of friendly
relations among nations recalled in both the Diplomatic Convention and
Convention on Consular Relations. 33 Second, if a sending State does not
respond by reciprocally exercising criminal jurisdiction over the United
States diplomatic and consular personnel fundamental notions of sover-
eign equality would be upset. Third, even the potential for sending and
receiving state retaliatory actions against diplomatic and consular per-
sonnel unnecessarily could foster bilateral tensions. 34 Fourth, the pros-
pect that criminal jurisdiction immunity may be removed by foreign
receiving states will discourage individuals from entering the already de-
pleted United States foreign service.35 Finally, the existing foreign ser-
vice corps understandably may be reluctant to accept posts in states
where local criminal laws, procedures, and customs do not follow United
States notions of due process and concern for individual rights. The risks
30. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 464.
31. See supra notes 10, 28. Elihu Lauterpacht, who served as the Secretary of the British
Committee on State Immunity, the work of which led to the adoption of the Diplomatic Im-
munity Act of 1955 by Great Britain, recalled that the Committee attached great importance
to ensuring reciprocal treatment for British diplomats serving in foreign countries. Letter
from E. Lauterpacht to J. Hickey (May 22, 1989) (a copy is on file with the Hastings Law
Journal.)
32. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
33. Diplomatic Convention, supra note 21, 23 U.S.T. at 3230, T.I.A.S No. 5720, at 4, 500
U.N.T.S. at 96; Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 28, 21 U.S.T. at 79, T.I.A.S No.
6820, at 3, 500 U.N.T.S. at 262.
34. See Gordon, U.S., Saying It Hopes to End Expulsions, Ousts Soviet Trade Envoy, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 24, 1989, at A10, col. 1; Soviets Denounce Expulsion Ofa Diplomat From the U.S.,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1989, at 6, col. 4; China Faults U.S. in Dispute On Diplomats' Travel
Rights, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1988, at A3, col. 5.
35. See Sciolino, Dollars v. Diplomacy: Austerity at State Dep't, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15,
1987, at A1, col. 1; Perry, Requiem for Diplomats, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1986, at A25, col. 1.
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of arbitrary arrest, manufactured charges of criminal activity, and un-
duly harsh punishment would be enhanced.
36
The International Court of Justice in the Iranian Hostages Case co-
gently articulated the foundational interrelationship and relevance of
sovereign equality and reciprocity to the present international law on
criminal jurisdiction immunity in the light of the history of diplomatic
law as a whole:
[t]here is no more fundamental prerequisite for the conduct of relations
between States than the inviolability of diplomatic envoys and embas-
sies, so that throughout history nations of all creeds and cultures have
observed reciprocal obligations for that purpose.... [T]he obligations
thus assumed, notably those for assuring the personal safety of diplo-
mats and their freedom from prosecution, are essential, unqualified,
and inherent in their representative character and their diplomatic
function.
37
In the Iranian Hostages Case, the United States successfully claimed
that Iran was obligated under international law to afford "the diplomatic
and consular personnel of the United States the protection, privileges and
immunities to which they are entitled, including immunity from any
form of criminal jurisdiction" and to "ensure that no such personnel
shall be obliged to appear on trial or ... at any proceedings" conducted
by the Iranian Government. 38 The Iranian Government in part justified
its seizure and detention of United States diplomatic and consular per-
sonnel on grounds that those personnel had committed crimes against
Iranian law.39 It is at least questionable whether, because of the reci-
procity premise for immunity, the United States' claim of criminal juris-
diction immunity in the Iranian Hostages Case would have been
successful if United States law had provided, even in a limited way, for
the detention, arrest, and criminal prosecution of foreign diplomatic
personnel.
A recent example of United States' reliance on the related theories
of reciprocity and sovereign equality was the State Department's com-
plaint regarding China's restrictions on the travel of Americans at the
United States Consulate in the city of Shenyang in northeast China.4°
36. See Roosevelt, Immunity is Necessary for Diplomacy, Wall St. J., Nov. 23, 1987, at A-
11, col. 1; ROOSEVELT, DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY AND U.S. INTERESTS, U.S. Dep't of State,
Bureau of Public Affairs, Current Policy No. 993, (Aug. 1987), at 1, col. 1.
37. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, (U.S. v. Iran), 1979 I.C.J. 7,
19 (Provisional Order of Dec. 15), cited with approval in United States Diplomatic and Consu-
lar Staff in Tehran, 1980 I.C.J. 3, 42 (Judgment).
38. U.S. v. Iran, 1980 I.C.J. at 7.
39. U.S. v. Iran, 1980 I.C.J. at 9.
40. See China Faults U.S. in Dispute On Diplomats' Travel Rights, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30,
1988, at A3, col. 5.
January 1990]
The basis for the State Department's complaint was that the Chinese re-
strictions were "unreasonable since they go well beyond restrictions" on
Chinese diplomats in the United States.41 The United States responded
by issuing a reciprocal ban on officials at the Chinese Consulate at Chi-
cago from traveling beyond the city and its suburbs without
permission.
42
Even if functional necessity were the sole theoretical premise for
criminal jurisdiction immunity, the unilateral subjection of foreign dip-
lomats to receiving state criminal jurisdiction would not be justified. If
foreign diplomats faced either the possibility of criminal prosecution
under receiving state law for carrying out normal diplomatic functions,
or exposure to misapplication of a receiving state's criminal justice sys-
tem (for example, by having false criminal charges brought against
them), their ability to function effectively in "the orderly and effective
conduct of friendly relations between states" would be seriously ham-
pered.43 It is axiomatic that nothing is more important to the effective
functioning of a diplomat than the ability to engage in uninhibited dis-
course. A receiving state law that subjects foreign diplomatic personnel
to criminal jurisdiction creates an unacceptable potential that a foreign
diplomat bearing an unsavory message might be criminally prosecuted.
In such circumstances, the atmosphere for uninhibited discourse is pol-
luted. In addition, "the diplomat's own immunity would be meaningless
if his family residing with him did not have the same immunities [be-
cause] [t]he threat of [criminal] actions could be used to intimidate the
diplomat."
44
B. Unilateral Removal of Criminal Jurisdiction Immunity from Diplomatic
Personnel Under Customary International Law and the
International Treaty Obligations of the United States
S. 1437 would remove criminal jurisdiction immunity conferred as a
matter of right by general and specific international law, from diplomatic
personnel who are "members of a foreign mission (other than diplomatic
agents)" as defined by "Article l(e) of the . .. [Diplomatic] Conven-
tion."'45 Although the meaning of the foregoing phrase is far from clear,
arguably S.1437 would operate to remove the criminal jurisdiction im-
munity presently accorded by international law to a wide range of diplo-
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, introductory note to §§ 464-66 (Diplomatic and Con-
sular Immunities); see also supra, text accompanying notes 28-42.
44. ROOSEVELT, supra note 36, at 5.
45. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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matic personnel.46 These personnel might include the administrative and
technical staffs of embassies, members of the U.N. Secretary General's
Office, representatives of the member states to the U.N., the OAS, the
Commission of the European Commission, the Commission and staff
members of the U.S-Mexico International Boundary and Water Commis-
sion, and the embassy employees of the U.S.S.R., several Eastern Euro-
pean states, and the People's Republic of China.47 It would also remove
any immunity presently enjoyed by family members of diplomatic
agents.48 Subjecting those presently-immune persons to criminal juris-
diction would contravene existing customary international law and trea-
ties to which the United States is a party.
The Vienna Convention On Diplomatic Relations (Diplomatic Con-
vention) to which the United States is a party,49 codifies customary inter-
national law50 on immunity from local criminal jurisdiction dating from
antiquity.51 The Diplomatic Convention has been accepted as law and
46. In general, persons listed by the Department of State as diplomatic officers and their
families, or as administrative and technical staff of diplomatic missions and their families,
presumptively are considered to have diplomatic rank and to enjoy full immunity from crimi-
nal jurisdiction.
47. See infra notes 53 and 55-68 and accompanying text.
48. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
49. The Diplomatic Convention was concluded in 1961 and came into force in 1964. As
of 1987, 148 States (including the United States) were parties to the Convention. 23 U.S.T.
3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
The domestic law of the handful of states that have not acceded to the Diplomatic Con-
vention is nevertheless consistent with the Convention's provisions. See Brown, supra note 13,
at 53 n.3.
The 1961 Convention On Diplomatic Relations was the product of the work of the Inter-
national Law Commission (ILC). The ILC began work on the subject of "diplomatic inter-
course and immunities" in response to Resolution 685 adopted on December 5, 1952, in which
the United Nations General Assembly expressed its desire for the common observance by all
governments of existing principles of international law and practice on the treatment of diplo-
matic representatives and requested that the ILC give priority to the topic. G.A. Res. 832, 7
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 62, U.N. Doc. A/2361 (1952). The ILC eventually adopted a
draft set of articles and referred them to the Vienna Conference for consideration. The Vienna
Conferees unanimously (Tunisia abstaining) adopted the present Convention that articulates
the current rules for the conduct of diplomatic relations. Vienna convention on Diplomatic
Relations, U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf. 20/13 (1961) (entered into force Apr. 24, 1964).
50. The term "customary international law" is used in its usual sense to mean the general
practice of states accepted as law. See article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice, appended to U.N. CHARTER, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1003, T.S. No. 993, at 3 TREA-
TIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
1776-1949, at 1030 (compiled by C. BEVANS) [hereinafter BEVANS] 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S.
No. 993, at 997; id. at 1187 (referring to "international custom, as evidence of a general prac-
tice accepted as law"); see also H. THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND COD-
IFICATION 53-56 (1972); Hickey, Custom and Land-Based Pollution Of The High Seas, 15 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 409, 413-20 (1978).
51. The notion that foreign diplomats are immune from local criminal jurisdiction ex-
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successfully applied by virtually all states for nearly a quarter of a cen-
tury without amendment or alteration. In addition, the Diplomatic Con-
vention is fully incorporated into the law of the United States by the 1978
Diplomatic Relations Act (DRA).
52
The Diplomatic Convention confers criminal jurisdiction immunity
as a matter of right on the head of a diplomatic mission (e.g., ambassa-
dors, nuncios, envoys, ministers, and charges d'affaires), diplomatic staff
(e.g., mission members of diplomatic rank such as attachs, counsellors,
and diplomatic secretaries), and members of administrative and technical
staff who are not nationals or permanent residents of the receiving state
(e.g., archivists, clerical staff, librarians, researchers and technical
staff).5 3 Immunity from criminal jurisdiction also extends to family
tends to "ancient times." See Preamble to the Diplomatic Convention, supra note 21, 3227
U.T.S. at 3230, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, at 4, 500 U.N.T.S. at 96. The "inviolability of the diplomat
[that he is not subject to any form of arrest or detention] is the oldest and the most fundamen-
tal rule of diplomatic law." C. LEWIS, supra note 13, at 172. "The immunity of an ambassa-
dor from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State was, after inviolability, the earliest of
the basic rules of diplomatic law to be established." Id. at 174.
Foreign envoys were accorded certain immunities, including immunity from local juris-
diction, by, among others, the Hittites, the Babylonians, the Assyrians, the Hebrews, the
Greek city-states, the ancient Chinese, Egyptians, Indians, and Romans. Barnes, supra note 13
at 173-74. In ancient Greece and Rome it "was an established rule that the representatives of
foreign sovereigns and communities were not amenable to the local jurisdiction." C. PHILLIP-
SON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM OF ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME 330 (1979).
In the fifteenth century, with the emergence of the modern State and of permanent diplo-
matic missions, the notion of immunity from local jurisdiction became more firmly accepted
and immunity was extended to a permanent diplomatic mission's staff and a diplomatic en-
voy's family members. By the end of the sixteenth century, "the inviolability of the ambassa-
dor was firmly ... established as a rule of customary international law." E. DENZA, supra
note 13 at 135; see also Barnes, supra note 13 at 174, which refers to the firm establishment of
the theory of diplomatic immunity for criminal jurisdiction in "the treatises of Grotius,
Zouche, and Bynkershoek in the 17th century." By no later than the eighteenth or early nine-
teenth century, the practice of states reflected acceptance of the principle of immunity from
local criminal jurisdiction as a binding customary international law obligation. See generally
E. ADAIR, THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF AMBASSADORS IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVEN-
TEENTH CENTURIES (1929); C. CARTER, THE WESTERN EUROPEAN POWERS, 1500-1700
(1971); A. GENTILI, THREE BOOKS ON EMBASSIES (1594 ed.) (Laing trans. 1964); H. GRO-
TIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (Loomis trans. 1949); G. MATTINGLY, RENAISSANCE
DIPLOMACY (1988); M. OGDON, JURIDICAL BASES OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY (1936); J. PU-
ENTE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED TO FOREIGN STATES (1928); G. STUART, AMERI-
CAN DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PRACTICE (2d ed. 1952); C. VAN BYNKERSHOEK, A
MONOGRAPH ON THE JURISDICTION OVER AMBASSADORS IN BOTH CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
CASES (Laing trans. 1964); Barnes, supra note 13.
52. 22 U.S.C. § 254(a)-(e) (1982). The Diplomatic Relations Act replaced the Act of
1790, 1 Stat. 117, 22 U.S.C. § 252 (repealed 1978), which was based on the English Statute of
Queen Anne of 1708.
53. See articles 1, 14, 29, 31 and 37 of the Diplomatic Convention, supra note 21, 23
U.S.T. at 3230-44, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, at 4-18, 500 U.N.T.S. at 96-117. Administrative and
technical staff provide embassies with services ranging from clerical assistance to highly classi-
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members, including the immune person's spouse, minor children, and
other household dependents.
5 4
In addition to the immunity afforded diplomatic personnel under
general international law, the United States confers criminal jurisdiction
immunity on additional personnel as a matter of lex specialis with partic-
ular states and international organizations.
Under section 15 of the Headquarters Agreement between the
United States and the United Nations, the United States is required to
accord to representatives of United Nations member states "the same
privileges and immunities ... as it accords to diplomatic envoys accred-
ited to it."'55 Similarly, section 11 of the Convention on the Privileges
and Immunities of the United Nations, to which the United States is a
party, accords representatives of principal international organizations the
same privileges and immunities as diplomatic agents.5 6 OAS member
representatives also have immunity from criminal jurisdiction under the
Agreement Relating to Privileges and Immunities of 1975 between the
United States and the OAS. 57 Permanent observers to the OAS and their
fled activities involving encoding and other technologically complex matters. Their numbers
may be expected to expand as a result of a heightened need for such personnel in an age of
rapidly advancing technology. As asserted by the Department of State's Chief of Protocol
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
The members of the administrative and technical staff of an embassy must have full
criminal immunity in order to perform their jobs effectively. These personnel per-
form tasks fundamental to the operation of the embassy. Many of them, including
communicators who transmit encoded messages and secretaries who type the mis-
sion's classified documents, engage in very sensitive work.
RoosEVELT, supra note 36, at 5. Members of domestic service staff, who are not nationals or
permanent residents of the receiving state (for example cooks, maids, drivers, and gardeners)
are entitled only to immunity for their official acts, that is, "acts performed in the course of
their duties." Article 37(3), Diplomatic Convention, supra note 21, 3227 U.T.S. at 3244,
T.I.A.S. No. 5702, at 18, 500 U.N.T.S. at 116. Here it should be noted that the U.S.S.R., the
People's Republic of China, Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic embassy employ-
ees, by mutual agreement with the United States, have criminal jurisdiction immunity. See
infra notes 61, 62, 65, and 66 and accompanying text.
54. Article 37(1), Diplomatic Convention, supra note 21, 3227 U.T.S. at 3244, T.I.A.S.
No. 5702, at 18, 500 U.N.T.S. at 116, provides that immunity extends to "members of the
family... forming part of... [the] household" of those entitled to immunity from criminal
jurisdiction. The rather flexible term "household" in practice may include persons that fulfill
the social duties of hostess to a diplomatic agent, or an unemployed parent or grandchildren of
a diplomat who live in the diplomat's home. See E. DENZA, supra note 13, at 223-25.
55. U.N. Headquarters Agreement, June 26, 1945, 61 Stat. 3416, 3429; 12 BEVANS, supra
note 50, at 963.
56. Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted Feb. 13,
1946, 21 U.S.T. 1418, 1427-28, T.I.A.S. No. 6900, 6910-11, 1 U.N.T.S. 15, 21-22 (in force for
120 states).
57. Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of OAS Personnel, Mar. 20, 1975, 26 U.S.T.
1025, T.I.A.S. No. 8089.
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diplomatic staffs were accorded criminal jurisdiction immunity by Exec-
utive Order of President Gerald Ford on August 3, 1976.58 By Executive
Order of December 5, 1972, Richard Nixon extended diplomatic privi-
leges and immunities to the representatives to the Mission of the Com-
mission of the European Commission to the United States.59 Finally,
diplomatic privileges and immunities are accorded to the commissioners,
family members, and certain staff members of the International Bound-
ary and Water Commission by article 2 of the treaty between the United
States and Mexico.
60
The United States, by special bilateral agreements, also confers im-
munity from criminal jurisdiction to consular officers, family members,
and in most cases, to the embassy employees (including those not nor-
mally entitled to immunity) of the USSR,6' the Peoples Republic of
China,62 Hungary, 63 Poland, 64 Bulgaria, 65 the German Democratic Re-
public, 66 the Philippines, 67 and Romania.
68
Thus, the international law obligations of the United States to afford
immunity from criminal jurisdiction to the foreign diplomatic personnel
described above are clear as a matter of customary international law,
multilateral convention, and special international agreement. These in-
ternational law obligations may not be dispensed with unilaterally by the
United States. Of course, immunity may be removed at any time by mu-
58. Exec. Order No. 11,931, 3 C.F.R. 140 (1976), reprinted in 22 U.S.C. § 288g app. at
124 (1982).
59. Exec. Order No. 11,689, 3 C.F.R. 732 (1972), reprinted in 22 U.S.C. § 288h app. at
124 (1982).
60. Utilization of Waters of Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, Feb. 3,
1944, 59 stat. 1219, 1222-25, 9 BEVANS, supra note 50, at 1169-71.
61. See Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of Embassy Staffs, Dec. 14, 1978, U.S.-
USSR, 30 U.S.T. 2341, T.I.A.S. No. 9340.
62. See Consular Convention, U.S.-China, Sept. 17, 1980, modified Jan. 17, 1981, 33
U.S.T. 2973, T.I.A.S. No. 10209.
63. See Consular Convention, U.S.-Hungary, July 7, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 1141, T.I.A.S. No.
7641 (as to embassy employees, only the Administrative and Technical Staff have full criminal
immunity).
64. See Consular Convention, U.S.-Poland, May 31, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 1231; T.I.A.S. No.
7642 (criminal immunity for employees only for official acts).
65. See Consular Convention, U.S.-Bulgaria, Apr. 15, 1974, 26 U.S.T. 687, T.I.A.S. No.
8067.
66. See Consular Convention, U.S.-German Democratic Republic, Sept. 4, 1979, T.I.A.S.
No. 10061.
67. See Consular Convention, U.S.-Philippines, Mar. 14, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1741.




tual agreement of the United States and the States or international orga-
nizations involved. 6
9
In addition to violating the substantive international law of diplo-
matic privileges and immunities, a unilateral abrogation by the United
States of its multilateral and bilateral treaty commitments to afford crim-
inal jurisdiction immunity described above also would violate at least two
fundamental precepts of the law of treaties. 70 The fundamental obliga-
tion of states entering into international agreements is to perform the
terms of treaties in good faith (pacta sunt servanda).7 1 Arguably, a uni-
lateral abandonment by the United States of treaty obligations to afford
criminal jurisdiction immunity to foreign diplomatic and consular per-
sonnel violates this good faith performance duty.72 In addition, an abro-
gation of such a fundamental obligation would constitute a material
breach of treaty73 that is justified neither by the facts,74 nor by a funda-
mental change of circumstances (rebus sic stantibus).75 This would enti-
tle foreign sending states to suspend or terminate diplomatic and
consular privileges and immunities enjoyed by United States personnel
abroad under bilateral treaty or multilateral convention. 76
69. See Diplomatic Convention, supra note 21, 23 U.S.T. at 3241, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, at
15, 500 U.N.T.S. at 112.
70. See generally the Vienna Convention On the Law of Treaties, opened for signature
May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 [hereinafter Law of Treaties]; I. SINCLAIR, THE
VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (2d ed. 1984); Kearney & Dalton, The
Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT'L LAW 495 (1970).
71. Law of Treaties, supra note 70, at art. 26 ("Every treaty in force is binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.").
72. Id.
73. Id. at art. 60(3)(a),(b) ("A material breach of a treaty consists [of] a repudiation of
the treaty ... or the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or
purpose of the treaty.").
74. See the discussion of the present facts on "diplomatic crime" in the United States,
infra notes 104-15 and accompanying text.
75. See Law of Treaties, supra note 70, at art. 62; Fisheries Jurisdiction, (U.K. v. Ice.)
1973 I.C.J. 3, 20-21 (a change of circumstances that gives rise to an entitlement to revoke a
treaty obligation must constitute a radical transformation of the extent of the treaty obligation
still to be performed). The United States is a signatory to the Vienna Convention but it has not
yet been acted upon by the United States Senate. Nevertheless, the Law of Treaties' provisions
on pacta sunt servanda and rebus sic stantibus merely articulate customary international law.
Law of Treaties, supra note 70, at arts. 60, 62. In addition, the Department of State considers
the Vienna Convention as codifying binding customary international law. See U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, PUB. No. 8756, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
1973, 307, 482-83 (1974).
76. See Law of Treaties, supra note 70, at art. 60(1), (2).
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C. Removal of Criminal Jurisdiction Immunity for Members of Foreign
Consular Posts Other Than Consular Officers Under Special
Bilateral International Agreements7 7
Consular relations among states have an unsettled and vague history
in contrast to the unambiguous evolution of customary international law
regarding diplomatic privileges and immunities. Historically, in the ab-
sence of governing bilateral or regional treaties, criminal jurisdiction im-
munity for consular personnel was considered more likely as not a matter
of nonobligatory usage than a requirement of customary international
law. 78 Nonetheless, in 1963, on the heels of the Diplomatic Convention,
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Consular Convention)
was concluded. It entered into force in 196779 and the United States
adopted the convention in 1969. The Consular Convention broke new
ground in converting mere usages into binding treaty obligations. It is
generally recognized today, however, that the Consular Convention re-
flects the basic obligations of consular relations among states, subject to
change by bilateral treaty.
Consular relations between states differ fundamentally from diplo-
matic relations. Consular personnel, in contrast to diplomatic personnel,
usually are not responsible for providing official communications be-
tween the sending and receiving states. For that reason receiving states
77. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 465 (discussing immunities of consular
personnel); L. LEE, supra note 13, at 115-411 (discussing immunity of consular personnel from
criminal jurisdiction).
78. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 359-60, accurately refers to the status of consuls as
historically "based upon general usage rather than law" and to the "existence of fairly uniform
practices (whatever the customary law might be), evidenced by a large number of bilateral
treaties .... " Brownlie specifically refers to the "differences of opinion [among authorities]
concerning the personal inviolability of consular officials .... Id. at 360. L. LEE, supra note
13, at 15-16, distinguishes between the tasks that faced the consular convention conferees and
the diplomatic convention conferees: "Unlike the Diplomatic Conference of 1961, which...
had the relatively simpler task of restating the principle of absolute criminal jurisdiction immu-
nity which had so characterized the diplomatic status for centuries, the consular conference
was under the necessity of breaking new ground" (footnote omitted). See also do Nascimento
e Silva, The Vienna Conference on Consular Relations, 13 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 1214, 1216
(1964), who refers to consular law as "not ripe for codification" before 1939. He also refers to
consular law in the post-World War II period as "a reasonable international custom." Id. at
1218.
79. Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 28, 21 U.S.T. at 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820,
at 1, 596 U.N.T.S. at 261. The 1963 Consular Convention, like the Diplomatic Convention,
was the work product of the ILC, which began its work in 1955 and finally referred a set of
draft articles to the Vienna Conference convened in 1963. Ninety-two governments partici-
pated in the conference, which on April 23, 1963, adopted the present Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations. See L. LEE, supra note 13, 205-19 (1966). As of 1987, 110 states (includ-
ing the United States in 1969) were parties to the Convention. See L. HENKIN, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 340 (Basic Documents Supp.) (2d ed 1987).
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generally grant substantially fewer privileges to consular personnel. In
general, consular personnel carry out functions assigned to them by the
sending state that are permitted by the receiving state. Normally, those
functions include safeguarding the interests of the sending state and those
of its nationals in the receiving state, developing commercial, cultural,
and scientific ties, issuing travel documents (passports and visas), and
assisting private individuals and corporations of the sending state present
in the receiving state on a variety of problems such as estate and inheri-
tance matters, representation before receiving state courts and tribunals,
and authentication of marriage and divorce documents8 0
Absent special agreement otherwise, the personal inviolability of
consular personnel is limited to their job-related functions and there is no
immunity from federal or state criminal jurisdiction. 8 ' Normally all con-
sular officers (heads of consular posts, vice-consuls, or any person en-
trusted by the sending state with the exercise of consular functions),
employees (administrative or technical staff), and service staff (domestic
help) are subject to arrest, detention, and criminal process.82 Ordinarily,
the only qualification is that consular officers are immune from pretrial
arrest and detention "except in the case of a grave crime [i.e., a felony]
and pursuant to a decision by the competent judicial authority [i.e., a
court-issued warrant]."
'8 3
80. See Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 28, 21 U.S.T. at 82-85, T.I.A.S.
No. 6820, at 6, 596 U.N.T.S. at 208-70; RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 465 reporters' note 4;
L. LEE, supra note 13, at 51-73.
81. The Diplomatic Relations Act in § 8(a)(1), 28 U.S.C. § 1351 (1982), amended the
United States Code so as to restrict exclusive federal court jurisdiction against "consuls or vice
consuls of foreign states" to "civil actions and proceedings" only, thus permitting state courts
to exercise jurisdiction over criminal actions. See State v. Killeen, 39 Or. App. 369, 592 P.2d
268 (1979) (§ 1351 does not divest state court from jurisdiction over consular official charged
with traffic infractions occurring outside the performance of official consular duties); RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 13, § 465 reporters' note 12 (discusses modem interpretation of
§ 1351, allowing states to enforce criminal laws against foreign consular officials).
82. See Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 28, art. l(d)-(f), 21 U.S.T. at 80,
T.I.A.S. No. 6820, at 4, 596 U.N.T.S. at 264, for definitions of consular officers, employees,
and service staff.
83. Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 28, art. 41(1), 21 U.S.T. at 103,
T.I.A.S. No. 6820, at 27, 596 U.N.T.S. at 296. Several comments are in order here. The State
Department considers "grave crime" to mean a felony. See OFFICE OF PROTOCOL AND THE
OFFICE OF FOREIGN MISSIONS, U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, PUB. No. 9533, GUIDANCE FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, PERSONAL RIGHTS AND IMMUNITIES OF FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC
AND CONSULAR PERSONNEL 7 (rev. ed. 1988) [hereinafter GUIDANCE FOR LAW ENFORCE-
MENT OFFICERS]; see also, L. LEE supra note 13, at 129-33 (difficult to arrive at a uniform
definition of "grave crime," given its relatively conceptual nature). Article 41 of the Conven-
tion on Consular Relations, supra note 28, 21 U.S.T. at 103-04, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, at 27-28,
596 U.N.T.S. at 296, addresses the personal inviolability of consular officers as follows:
1. Consular officers shall not be liable to arrest or detention pending trial, except in
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Unlike the blanket criminal jurisdiction immunity afforded diplo-
matic personnel as a matter of presumptive right, the sending states have
the case of a grave crime and pursuant to a decision by the competent judicial
authority.
2. Except in the case specified in paragraph I of this Article, consular officers shall
not be committed to prison or liable to any other form of restriction on their personal
freedom save in execution of a judicial decision of final effect.
3. If criminal proceedings are instituted against a consular officer, he must appear
before the competent authorities. Nevertheless, the proceedings shall be conducted
with the respect due to him by reason of his official position and, except in the case
specified in paragraph 1 of this Article, in a manner which will hamper the exercise
of consular functions as little as possible. When, in the circumstances mentioned
in paragraph 1 of this Article, it has become necessary to detain a consular officer,
the proceedings against him shall be instituted with the minimum of delay.
Article 42 requires the receiving state, in the event that consular personnel are arrested or
detained, to notify the head of the consular post or the sending state as appropriate. Id., 21
U.S.T. at 104, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, at 28, 596 U.N.T.S. at 296.
Article 43(1) sets out the limited functional immunity accorded to consular personnel:
1. Consular officers and consular employees shall not be amenable to the jurisdic-
tion of the judicial or administrative authorities of the receiving state in respect of
acts performed in the exercise of consular functions.
Id., 21 U.S.T. at 104, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, at 28, 596 U.N.T.S. at 298.
It is fair to read the functional immunity mentioned in article 43(1) as not extending to
crimes committed by consular officers and employees, but rather as limited to civil acts. To
interpret the functional immunity provision otherwise would appear to require reading article
43 as the controlling provision and article 41 as subordinate to it. However, such a preemi-
nence for article 43 seems inconsistent with other articles of the Convention on Consular Rela-
tions and with United States practice. For example, article 55(1) requires consular personnel
to "respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State," id., 21 U.S.T. at 113, T.I.A.S. No.
6820, at 37, 596 U.N.T.S. at 308, and article 5(m) limits consular functions to functions
"which are not prohibited by the laws and regulations of the receiving State .... " Id., 21
U.S.T. at 85, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, at 9, 596 U.N.T.S. at 270. Article 5 contains several other
references to the limitation of consular functions to only legal acts. Subsection (c) of article 5
refers to "lawful means" of collecting and reporting information, subsection (h) requires that
the safeguarding of the interests of minors and others lacking full capacity be carried out
"within the limits imposed by the laws and regulations of the receiving State," and subsection
() mandates that the taking of evidence by consular personnel for the courts of the sending
state be accomplished in a "manner compatible with the laws and regulations of the receiving
State." Id., 21 U.S.T. at 83-84, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, at 7-8, 596 U.N.T.S. at 268, 270. It is
difficult to imagine that a receiving state would ever acknowledge that a criminal act under
receiving state law committed by a consular officer or employee was nevertheless a consular
function. See L. LEE, supra note 13, at 115-29. Moreover, there already exists the "grave
crime" standard for the inviolability of consular officers in article 41(1). Nevertheless, the two
standards, grave crime and consular function, exist and arguably each standard might apply to
criminal acts of consular personnel.
The State Department refers to consular officers as having "official acts or functional
immunity in respect of both criminal and civil matters" and elaborates on the criminal aspect
as follows:
A person enjoying official acts immunity from criminal jurisdiction may always be
prosecuted if the responsible host government authorities believe that the criminal
act is outside the scope of the individual's official duties, and may in this connection
always be required to appear in court (in person or through counsel). At this point,
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the burden of demonstrating the existence of such immunity for their
consular personnel. 84 With regard to diplomatic personnel, the receiving
state has the burden of proving that immunity from criminal jurisdiction,
once asserted, does not apply in a given case.85 With consular personnel,
however, the burden of proving consular status is on the officer or em-
ployee claiming it.86 The allocation of burden of proof between sending
and receiving states reflects that immunity from criminal jurisdiction is a
however, such person may assert as an affirmative defense that the actions com-
plained of arose in connection with the performance of official acts. If, upon exami-
nation of the circumstances complained of, the court agrees, then the court is without
jurisdiction to proceed and the case must be dismissed.
GUIDANCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, supra, at 7-8. The current U.S. state practice
is to enter special bilateral treaties in order to confer criminal jurisdiction immunity on consu-
lar personnel. See supra notes 61-68; infra notes 90-94. The United States would not need to
do this if it considered that the Consular Convention itself extended immunity to crimes. State
Department officials recently have expressed the view that its practice is to treat foreign consu-
lar personnel, in the absence of special treaty or agreement, as not having immunity from
criminal jurisdiction. Differing treatment by some local law enforcement agencies is usually a
result of local misunderstanding and confusion rather than an official United States practice
endorsing criminal jurisdiction immunity. Perhaps the best explanation for the inclusion in
the Convention on the Consular Relations of the two standards regarding criminal jurisdiction
immunity is that the conferees were "aiming at reaching as widely acceptable an agreement as
possible." L. LEE, supra note 13, at 133.
84. See infra note 86. Proposals also have been made to shift the burden of proof for
diplomatic personnel. 134 CONG. REC. S 16,045-46 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (Statement of Sen.
Helms). Not only is this shift in burden of proof logically inconsistent, but to compel a person,
immune as a matter of right, to establish legal entitlement to what already is granted her by
law, directly contravenes the Diplomatic Convention, the Diplomatic Relations Act, and cus-
tomary international law. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
85. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 465 reporters' note 1. See In re Baiz, 135 U.S. 403
(1890) (when defendant is not accredited as a diplomat, he has the burden of showing immu-
nity from prosecution); Carrera v. Carrera, 174 F.2d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (motion to dismiss
granted when State Department certified defendant's diplomatic immunity); Bergman v. De
Sieyes, 170 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948) (once the diplomat in transit claimed immunity, the only
inquiry was whether he was entitled to the same immunity as a diplomat in situs); Arcaya v.
Paez, 145 F. Supp. 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (the State Department's determination of diplomatic
immunity is binding in a libel action where the defendant moved for summary judgment);
United States v. Coplon, 84 F. Supp. 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (defendant is subject to jurisdiction
of court when he fails to show State Department accreditation and fails to prove immunity as
employee of the U.N.); In re Terrence K., 138 Misc. 2d 611, 524 N.Y.S.2d 996 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
1988) (diplomatic agent's son ordered returned to the foreign mission when the court recog-
nized the claim of immunity made on behalf of the diplomat and his family).
86. As to the pleading of consular immunity, see generally Gerritsen v. Hurtado, 819
F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1987) (court rejected immunity, determining that the acts of the consular
officials did not constitute consular functions); Heaney v. Government of Spain, 445 F.2d 501
(2d Cir. 1971) (consul was deemed immune from suit onlyafter court determined that he had
exercised appropriate consular functions); Silva v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. App. 3d 269, 125
Cal. Rptr. 78 (1975) (whether the Consul of Mexico was immune because acting within the
scope of his official duties was a question of fact); Commonwealth v. Jerez, 390 Mass. 456, 457
N.E.2d 1105 (1983) (official acting within his official capacity was immune from prosecution).
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legal right for diplomatic personnel while, to the extent that it exists, it is
a privilege for consular personnel.
87
The limited functional immunity and personal inviolability accorded
to consular personnel, in contrast to diplomatic personnel, does not ex-
tend to family members. In addition, the special category of honorary
consuls, who are noncareer, part-time representatives of the sending
state, enjoy no personal inviolability or immunity from criminal
jurisdiction.
88
Legislative proposals to remove criminal jurisdiction immunity for
consular personnel (other than consular officers) would not affect ordi-
nary consular relations because there is, as a general matter, no "immu-
nity" from local criminal jurisdiction.8 9 The United States, however, has
negotiated several special bilateral consular arrangements that do confer
immunity from criminal jurisdiction on foreign consular personnel and
that would be affected by unilateral removal of criminal jurisdiction im-
munity. For example, the 1968 Consular Convention between the
United States and the USSR accords to consular personnel who are not
nationals of the United States full criminal immunity jurisdiction. 90 Sim-
ilar bilateral consular agreements granting criminal jurisdiction immu-
nity exist between the United States and Hungary, 9 1 the Peoples
Republic of China, 92 the Philippines, 93 and Poland.94 The S. 1437 propo-
sal to deny immunity for members of consular posts in the United States
would violate these specific bilateral treaty arrangements. 9
5
87. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
88. Article 63 of the Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 28, 21 U.S.T. at 116,
T.I.A.S. No. 6820, at 40-41, 596 U.N.T.S. at 314, provides that "[i]f criminal proceedings are
instituted against an honorary consular officer, he must appear before the competent
authorities."
89. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
90. Consular Convention, U.S.-U.S.S.R., June 1, 1964, 19 U.S.T. 5018, 5031, T.I.A.S.
No. 6503, at 14. Under article 73 of the Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 28, 21
U.S.T. at 121, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, at 45, 596 U.N.T.S. at 320, states may grant greater privi-
leges and immunities than provided for in the Convention. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 13,
§ 465 reporters' note 3; GUIDANCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, supra note 83, at 7
n.5.
91. Consular Convention, U.S.-Hungary, supra note 63, 24 U.S.T at 1152-53,, T.I.A.S.
No. 7641, at 12-13.
92. Consular Convention, U.S.-China, supra note 62, 33 U.S.T. at 2896-97, T.I.A.S. No.
10209, at 14-15.
93. Consular Convention, U.S.-Philippines, supra note 67.
94. Consular Convention, U.S.-Poland, supra note 64.
95. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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Thus, by any measure, a unilateral legislative removal of existing
criminal jurisdiction immunity by the United States conflicts with funda-
mental international law theory, custom, and treaties.
II. Unilateral Curtailment of Criminal Jurisdiction Immunity
Under United States Law
The customary international law and treaty provisions assuring im-
munity from United States criminal jurisdiction set out in section I also
form part of the law of the United States. As the Supreme Court stated
in The Paquete Habana:96 "International law is part of our [United
States] law and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of
justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending
upon it are duly presented for their determination. ' ' 97 Moreover, article
VI of the United States Constitution provides that "all treaties made...
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of
the Land."'
98
In addition, the customary and treaty law set out above specifically
has been made a part of United States law by the Diplomatic Relations
Act of 1978 (DRA).99 The first law on diplomatic immunity in the
United States was the act of April 30, 1790,100 which was based on an
earlier English statute.' 0 ' The 1790 statute essentially provided diplo-
mats with absolute immunity from United States criminal and civil juris-
96. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
97. Id. at 700; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 111(3).
98. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957) (quoting Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267
(1890)) ("The Treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited except by
those restraints which are found in that instrument against the action of the government or of
its departments, and those arising from the nature of the government itself and that of the
States."); United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 207-08 (1926) ("Of course, all treaties and
statutes of the United States are based on the Constitution; and, in a remote sense, what is
done by or under them is done under it. . . . The decisions of this Court generally have
regarded treaties as on much the same plane as acts of Congress, and as usually subject to the
general limitations in the Constitution .... ,); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)
("By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with
an act of legislation. Both are declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land,
and no superior efficacy is given to either over the other."); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580,
598 (1884) ("The Constitution of the United States places such provision, as these in the same
category as other laws of Congress by its declaration that [article VI] ... [a] treaty, then, is a
law of the land as an act of Congress is .... ").
99. 22 U.S.C. § 254(a)-(e) (1982). Subsection (d) provides that "[a]ny [criminal] action
or proceeding brought against an individual who is entitled to immunity" under the Diplo-
matic Convention shall be dismissed.
100. Law of April 30, 1790, ch. IX, § 25, 1 Stat. 117, 22 U.S.C. § 252 (1976), repealed by
Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, § 3, 92 Stat. 808, 808.
101. 7 Anne, ch. XII (1708).
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diction. The DRA replaced the 1790 statute. 10 2 The DRA implements
the Diplomatic Convention's provisions on criminal immunity and re-
quires such immunity as a matter of United States law for both parties
and nonparties to the Diplomatic Convention. Under the DRA, the
President may treat members of a diplomatic mission and their families
less favorably than provided for in the Diplomatic Convention only "on
the basis of reciprocity."' 1 3 Thus, any unilateral legislation like S.1437
that eliminates existing criminal jurisdiction immunity, both violates
United States' law in the form of the DRA and invites or compels recip-
rocal foreign legislation against United States' diplomatic and consular
personnel serving abroad.
III. The Facts Do Not Merit a Change in
Existing Immunity Law
Legislative proposals to limit immunity from criminal jurisdiction
impliedly are premised on the misperception that "diplomatic crime" is a
significant national problem. 10 4  In the past decade the number of for-
eigners entitled to some measure of diplomatic and consular privileges
and immunities in the United States has more than doubled from a 1977
total of 23,569105 to 55,971106 in 1987, of which roughly 27,000107 were
entitled to complete immunity from criminal jurisdiction. That increase,
however, has not translated into a significant national crime problem
meriting a legislative response. 0 8 First, to the extent a diplomatic crime
102. 22 IJ.S.C. § 254(a)-(e) (1982).
103. Id. § 254(e).
104. See supra notes 5-12 and accompanying text.
105. See Claims Against Persons Entitled to Diplomatic Immunity: Hearings on H.R. 7679
Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977) reprinted in Cong. Information Serv. No.
H521-17 (1978). Of the 23,569 persons, 19,000 formed the diplomatic community in Washing-
ton, D.C. alone. Id., 123 CONG. REC. 25, 204 (1977) (Statement of Rep. Fascell). Diplomatic
Relations Act: House Debate on July 27, 1977, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in SENATE
COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ACT at 35 (1979).
106. BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 5, at 1. Mr. Timothy E. Leahy, Protocol Officer, Office
of Protocol, Department of State in September 1988, advised in a telephone interview that as of
1987, 3,070 diplomats excluding dependents and administrative and technical staff in Wash-
ington, D.C. alone had immunity from criminal jurisdiction compared with 2,246 in 1978.
107. BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 5, at 2. The precise number of persons entitled to diplo-
matic immunity at any particular moment is not known, largely because there are a certain
number of diplomats and their dependents, and diplomatic and consular personnel, arriving
and departing their posts, or in transit through the United States to other areas. The largest
estimate of those with criminal immunity as of March 18 1988 was 26,282; with official acts
immunity, 29,689. Id.
108. See infra note 112.
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problem exists, it is narrowly-confined to the New York City and Wash-
ington, D.C. metropolitan areas.109 Second, the "diplomatic crime" that
occurs in these areas is statistically insignificant. During a recent four
year period (1982-1985) there were a total of only 147 "diplomatic
crime" incidents in Washington, D.C. and forty-four such incidents in
New York.110 In 1988, the 29,000 diplomatic and consular personnel
residing in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area committed twenty-
three crimes out of the total reported crimes committed of 78,855.111
That represents a de minimus proportion (3/100th of 1 percent) of the
reported crimes in that area. 112 In addition, of those twenty-three
crimes., only five were serious offenses of the type that are the primary
concern of S.1437. The rest of the "crimes" were of the shoplifting vari-
ety that would not be covered by the "felony" standard of S.1437.113 In
New York from September 1987 to September 1988 there were only "11
crimes committed by diplomatic personnel or family members: 6 as-
saults, 1 shoplifting incident, 1 case of child abuse and 3 cases of drug
abuse."' 14 This hardly presents the factual occasion to enact legislation
unilaterally that disregards existing international law.
Thus, the facts of "diplomatic crime," quite apart from existing in-
ternational and United States law, clearly do not justify enactment of
legislation such as S_ 1437. In fact, it is far more likely that a diplomat
will be a victim of crime than a criminal offender. For example, in New
York City during the 1981-87 period "the ratio of crimes against diplo-
mats, compared with those committed by them, was 30 to 1."' '5 If any-
thing, the facts support legislation expanding rather than reducing U.S.
protection of foreign diplomats and consular personnel as proposed by
S. 1437.
IV. Present Remedies for "Diplomatic Crimes"
It should be noted that the immunity from criminal jurisdiction ac-
corded is immunity only from local jurisdiction; it does not dispense with
109. See infra note 110.
110. Study and Report Concerning the Status of Individuals with Diplomatic Immunity in
the United States; Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (FRAA),
Pub. L. No. 100-204, Sec. 137, prepared by the United States Department of State, Exhibits B-
l(a)-(c)-B-2(a)-(c) (1988).
111. Gookin, supra note 6, at 18.
112. Even accepting a reporting factor error of ten times, "diplomatic crime" expressed as
a percentage of total crime remains a statistically insignificant three-tenths of 1%.
113. See supra note 110.
114. Id.
115. Howe, Reduction Seen in Political Violence at U.N., N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1988, at 54,
col. 1.
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the firm obligation of foreign diplomatic and consular personnel to obey
local criminal laws in the receiving state. 1 6 That obligation remains in-
tact under existing law. A foreign diplomat who violates local criminal
law is subject to the full range of remedies available under United States
and international law. Those remedies, if diligently pursued, are more
than adequate to address existing "diplomatic crime" in the United
States.
Consistent with the obligation to obey local criminal laws and with
the underlying theories behind jurisdictional immunity, 117 there are clear
and unambiguous sanctions that may be applied by the United States as a
receiving state against criminal offenders entitled to immunity. First, the
receiving state may request that the sending state waive the immunity of
the persons who have committed crimes.' 18 Once the sending state
waives immunity, the receiving state may exercise criminal jurisdiction
and prosecute offenders to the full extent of local criminal law. Second,
the sending state-on its own initiative or at the urging of the receiving
state-may itself prosecute offending persons under its own criminal
laws.' 19 Third, the receiving state may remove offenders from society by
declaring them to be persona non grata. 120 This means that offenders no
116. Article 41(1) of the Diplomatic Convention, supra note 21, provides: "Without prej-
udice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privileges
and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State." 23 U.S.T. at 3247,
T.I.A.S. No. 7502, at 21, 500 U.N.T.S. at 120. The Convention on Consular Relations has a
similar provision in article 55. Supra note 28, 21 U.S.T. at 113, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, at 34, 596
U.N.T.S. 308-09. The International Law Commission commented on article 41 that
"[i]mmunity from jurisdiction implies merely that the agent may not be brought before the
[local] courts if he fails to fulfill his obligations." Report of the International Law Commission
to the General Assembly 13 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 26, U.N. Doc. A/3859 (1958),
reprinted in 2 Y.B. INT'L COMM'N 78, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1958/Add.1 (commentary
1 on draft art. 41). See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly,
12 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/3623 (1957), reprinted in 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 131 U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/SER.A/1957/Add.1 (commentary I on draft art. 33); see
also Dinstein, Diplomatic Immunity from Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae, 15 INT'L COMP. L. Q.
76, 81 (1966) (diplomatic immunity merely exempts agents from local jurisdiction, but does
not absolve them of legal liability).
117. See supra notes 22-44 and accompanying text.
118. Article 32(1) of the Diplomatic Convention provides that the "immunity... of diplo-
matic agents and of persons enjoying immunity . . . may be waived by the sending state."
Supra note 21, 23 U.S.T. at 3241, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, at 15, 500 U.N.T.S. at 112. Article 32(2)
requires that the waiver "must always be express" and may not be implied. Id.
119. Article 31(4) of the Diplomatic Convention provides that the "immunity of a diplo-
matic agent from the jurisdiction of the receiving State does not exempt him from the jurisdic-
tion of the sending State." Id.
120. Article 9(1) of the Diplomatic Convention provides that the "receiving State may at
any time and without having to explain its decision, notify the sending State that the head of
the mission or any member of the diplomatic staff.., is persona non grata . I. " Id., 23 U.S.T.
at 3233-34, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, at 7-8, 500 U.N.T.S. at 102.
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longer are welcome in the receiving state and must leave, or if they do
not leave, the receiving state does not have to treat them as immune per-
sons. 121 This remedy removes offenders from society more effectively
than domestic imprisonment and at no cost to the American taxpayer.
Further, this may have the added punitive effect of ending offenders' dip-
lomatic careers or at the very least, of subjecting them to international
opprobrium. Finally, it should be mentioned that once immunity is with-
drawn, offenders can then be subjected to criminal jurisdiction after a
reasonable period of time (usually thirty days) has elapsed.'
2 2
In addition to the offender-specific sanctions mentioned above, the
receiving state may take steps against a particular state delegation. That
is, under existing law the receiving state may unilaterally place any re-
striction it chooses on the size and qualification of diplomatic and consu-
lar delegations that are permitted to reside in receiving state territory. 2
3
Of course, the receiving state may also reduce the risk that foreign diplo-
matic and consular personnel will commit crimes in the receiving state
by insisting on a bilateral basis that states send better-qualified, less crim-
inally-inclined personnel to the receiving state.
Given the statistical insignificance of "diplomatic crime,"'124 the ex-
isting array of remedies and sanctions described above are an effective
deterrent to the commission of "diplomatic crimes." If "diplomatic
crime" increases in the future, then the United States should vigorously
pursue the available remedies outlined above. Indeed, strict application
of these existing remedies to respond to an increase in crimes committed
by diplomatic and consular personnel in general, or by members of a
121. Id. art. 9(2), 23 U.S.T. at 3234, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, at 8, 500 U.N.T.S. at 102.
122. Article 39(2) of the Diplomatic Convention provides that "[w]hen the functions of a
person enjoying privileges and immunities have come to an end, such privileges and immuni-
ties shall normally cease at the moment when he leaves the country, or an expiring of a reason-
able period in which to do so ..... " Id., 23 U.S.T. at 3245, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, at 19, 500
U.N.T.S. at 118. Article 39 nevertheless recognizes the continuation of immunity in connec-
tion with the individual's performance of official acts. Id. See generally Larsehan, The Abisin-
ito Affair: A Restrictive Theory of Diplomatic Immunity, 26 COLUJM. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 283
(1988) (discussing the scope of diplomatic immunity under U.S. and international law).
123. While the State Department consistently follows the Diplomatic Convention's desig-
nations of those entitled to diplomatic status, it need not do so. Article 4(2) of the Diplomatic
Convention, supra note 21, 23 U.S.T. at 3232, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, at 6, 500 U.N.T.S. at 100,
provides that "[t]he receiving state is not obliged to give reasons to the sending for a refusal" to
accredit a head of mission. Article 11(2) provides that the receiving state "may refuse to
accept officials of a particular category" from the sending state. Id., 23 U.S.T. at 3235,
T.I.A.S. No. 7502, at 9, 500 U.N.T.S. at 102. No explanation or justification need be provided
by the receiving state for it to act against particular persons or delegations under either article
4 or article 11.
124. See supra notes 104-15 and accompanying text.
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particular sending state mission, can be quite effective in assuring obedi-
ence to local law. For example, the British Foreign Office recently re-
duced unpaid parking tickets by the 18,000 member foreign diplomatic
corps residing in Great Britain from 108,845 in 1984 to 14,437 in
1987.125 It achieved this dramatic reduction of disregard for local law,
not by legislatively removing immunity from jurisdiction but by issuing
expulsion threats against repeat offenders. It would seem that a similar
vigorous use of the remedies outlined above are more than adequate to
address any future "diplomatic crime" problems in the United States.
As a last resort, if the receiving state does not have the cooperation
of the sending state in applying the above sanctions or if the crimes com-
mitted by immune persons are especially egregious and offensive to the
receiving state, it may break diplomatic relations with the sending state.
Finally, a word is in order on the victims of "diplomatic crime."
One unfortunate effect of all violent crime, whether committed by United
States citizens or aliens, is that victims rarely are made whole or compen-
sated for harm done to them. In the rare instances of "diplomatic
crime," however, victims often fare better than they would if they had
been victimized by a nondiplomat. It is not unusual for a foreign em-
bassy to voluntarily compensate victims of crimes committed by their
personnel. 12 6 In other cases of crimes committed by foreign diplomatic
and consular personnel, whether immune or not, the State Department,
through direct negotiations with the offender's embassy or consulate, has
successfully obtained an adequate measure of compensation for the vic-
tims of diplomatic crime.1
27
Alternative victim remunerative measures such as an insurance
scheme funded by foreign missions should, however, be rejected. Pay-
125. Fewer Envoys Scoff at a Threat by Britain, N.Y. Times, May 1, 1988, at 22, col. 1.
126. See U.S. State Dep't Reply to Congress, Policy for Security Ex Gratia Payments
(June 24, 1988).
127. For example, the State Department, in the publicized case of an alleged shooting of
an employee of a Washington. D.C. bar by the son of a foreign diplomat, obtained from the
embassy the full amount of compensation sought by the victim notwithstanding that the vic-
tim's domestic Workmen's Compensation claim was denied initially and then only settled 4
years after the ex gratia payment was made. Similarly, the State Department, in a property
damage claim, yielded a substantial sum in just 2 weeks after the claim was made. See U.S.
State Dep't Reply to Congress, Policy for Securing Ex Gratia Payments (June 24, 1988). The
State Department also has been successful in negotiating resolutions of cases in which the
appropriate redress is not monetary compensation. See In re Terrence K., 138 Misc. 2d 611,
524 N.Y.S.2d 996) (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1988) (An attach6 to the Zimbabwean Mission. who was
alleged to have abused his minor child, was asked to, and did in fact, leave the United States.
Here the State Department extracted assurances from the Zimbabwean government that the




ment of insurance premiums by foreign missions might reduce the sense
of responsibility for the behavior of individual foreign diplomatic or con-
sular personnel. In addition, sending states that could be compelled to
underwrite insurance schemes would have the right, on reciprocity and
sovereign equality grounds, to insist that the United States similarly un-
derwrite such schemes in their countries. Given the global diplomatic
and consular presence of the United States, this could involve a signifi-
cant federal budget allocation and could encourage deep-pocket claims
against these funds.128
V. Existing Law Should Not Be Changed as
a Matter of Policy
There are sound domestic and foreign policy reasons for not unilat-
erally subjecting segments of the presently immune foreign diplomatic
and consular community in the United States to criminal jurisdiction.
First, unilateral removal of criminal jurisdiction immunity puts the
United States diplomatic and consular corps at substantial risk. The
United States currently has over 30,000 American diplomats, including
their family members, living abroad. 29 On the basis of sovereign equal-
ity, reciprocity, and existing international law, these personnel enjoy the
same immunity from criminal jurisdiction presently enjoyed by the for-
eign diplomatic and consular personnel residing in the United States. If
S. 1437 or similar legislation were unilaterally enacted, other states, at a
minimum, could be expected to enact similar legislation subjecting
United States diplomatic and consular personnel to local criminal juris-
diction. The danger of fabricated charges against U.S. diplomatic corps
is greater in foreign legal systems that have fewer procedural safeguards
and less concern for the rights of those accused of criminal acts. It
should be noted also that in politically tense periods, when the need for
uninhibited diplomatic discourse is especially great, the danger of false
criminal arrest and detention may be at its greatest, as the Iran hostage
crisis made abundantly clear.1
3 0
Second, any unilateral legislation of the type represented by S. 1437
threatens ihe entire body of international law on diplomatic privileges
128. Telephone conversation with Timothy Leahy, Protocol Officer, Office of Protocol,
Dep't of State, June 20, 1989. Mr. Leahy stated that the State Department looked into a
proposed insurance scheme and rejected any such approach as not feasible, primarily because
of the apparent noninsurability of criminal acts.
129. See supra note 29.
130. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J.
3 (Judgment).
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and immunities. Such a unilateral abrogation of the Diplomatic Conven-
tion may provide an occasion for states that do not presently share the
Western view of diplomatic relations to insist upon a complete reexami-
nation of the Diplomatic and Consular Conventions. That reexamina-
tion, by itself, let alone the potential for dramatic change in diplomatic
and consular rights and duties, would introduce an unacceptable uncer-
tainty to diplomatic law and diplomatic relations.
Third, the United States' status as host nation for the United Na-
tions, the OAS, and other international organizations would be
threatened. 13 These organizations are likely to reexamine closely their
continued presence in the United States if their representatives are to
have their present diplomatic status and rights unilaterally reduced. On
the assumption that being host nation is in the overall long term foreign
policy interests of the United States, the legislation should be rejected for
this reason alone.
Finally, the community of nations has undergone a dramatic change
since World War II that must be digested over the coming decades. For
example, United Nations membership has more than tripled since
1945.132 The majority of these new states are third world, developing
states many of which were former colonies of the West. They under-
standably may view the diplomatic law to which they are presently
bound, which was developed by European state practice and codified by
Western states, as a vestige of colonialism designed to preserve and pro-
tect Western presence in their lands. As such, they may be more ready
than is appreciated by advocates of the proposed legislation to jettison
the law of diplomatic privileges and immunities with minimum provoca-
tion. Of course, it also is likely that as these states mature and develop
economically, they increasingly will appreciate the stability and value of
the longstanding law of diplomatic privilege and immunities to their con-
tinued development, economic well being, and uninhibited participation
in the family of nations.
Given the present political, cultural and economic diversity among
states today, the value of the present time-tested body of rules governing
criminal jurisdiction immunity for diplomatic and consular personnel is
greater than ever.
131. The recent action of the U.N. General Assembly to hold a session in Geneva rather
than New York when the U.S. refused to admit Yassir Arafat to address the General Assem-
bly illustrates the sensitivity of the United Nations to uninhibited discourse and to interference
in that discourse by unilateral action of the United States. See supra note 4.
132. United Nations membership, which now accounts for over 98 percent of the world's
population, rose from 51 in 1945 to 159 in 1989. See XXVI U.N. Chron No. 2, Back Cover
(June 1989).
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Conclusion
Congress should reject any legislative proposal to unilaterally re-
move or limit the immunity from criminal jurisdiction presently enjoyed
by foreign diplomatic and consular personnel residing in the United
States. Unilateral removal or limitation of existing criminal jurisdiction
immunity violates customary international law, multilateral and bilateral
treaties to which the United States is a party, and existing United States
law. Legislation like S. 1437 is inconsistent with the theoretical underpin-
nings for criminal jurisdiction immunity-state representation, sovereign
equality, reciprocity, and functional necessity. As a practical matter en-
actment of S. 1437 or a similar law would expose the diplomatic and con-
sular corps of the United States to unwarranted risk. From a foreign
policy perspective, unilateral removal or limitation of criminal jurisdic-
tion immunity from the foreign diplomatic and consular corps would in-
vite or even require the reciprocal removal of such immunity presently
enjoyed by American diplomats and their families living abroad. Re-
moval of such immunity would create a threat of false criminal prosecu-
tion, especially in periods of political tension when the need for
uninhibited discourse is particularly valuable. The exposure of the diplo-
matic and consular corps to such unnecessary risks ultimately may result
in a personnel shortage of individuals willing to serve at foreign posts.
There is no factual justification for the removal of criminal jurisdic-
tion immunity. The number of crimes committed by immune foreign
diplomatic and consular personnel in the United States is statistically in-
significant and these offenses are, for the most part, misdemeanors. In
the rare instance that an immune alien commits a serious crime, ade-
quate remedies exist under domestic and international law. A strict ap-
plication of the existing remedies should effectively address the problem
of "diplomatic crime" and serve as a potent deterrent. In addition, there
is no need for a specialized compensation or insurance fund for victims of
"diplomatic crime" because this might reduce the sense of individual re-
sponsibility of a foreign diplomatic personnel, and because the few seri-
ously harmed victims of diplomatic crime presently receive expeditious
and generous compensation as a matter of practice by foreign missions
with the encouragement of the State Department.
A unilateral legislative assault on this oldest and most settled area of
international law might be viewed by some members of the international
community as a confirmation of the view that the United States no longer
takes its international law obligations seriously, a perception that would
be detrimental in this time of concentrated and growing global inter-
dependence.
January 1990]
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United States lawyers are sometimes described as rather more effec-
tive at suggesting what the law ought to be, than at determining what the
law is. Here, existing international and domestic law is adequate and is
effective to address the criminal behavior of foreign diplomatic and con-
sular personnel. That law should not be tampered with lightly.
